ABSTRACT:
The debate surrounding the legal nature of carbon
emission rights arises from the tension between their dual characteristics of
public and private law, which challenges traditional property rights theory.
This tension has led to conflicts regarding the effectiveness of legal
frameworks, fragmented regulations, and a crisis of institutional trust within
the carbon market. Carbon emission rights should be redefined as a novel form
of usufructuary right, with ecological capacity resources—owned by the state—serving
as the object. These rights are realized through digitalization and specificity
enabled by blockchain technology. Their powers and functions can be understood
as twofold: the power of quota control, which falls under public law
constraints, and the power of ecological benefits, which exists within private
law autonomy. The former limits the boundaries of private rights by ecological
thresholds, while the latter translates ecological value into non-possession
benefits. To address these issues, a “two-stage governance” system can be
established through a dynamic interpretation of Article 329 of the Civil Code
of the People’s Republic of China (2020), creating a registration system and
enacting specialized legislation for Carbon Emission Rights Trading. By
conceptualizing carbon emission rights as a new type of usufructuary right, the
contradictions between public and private law can be reconciled, enabling the
transition of the carbon market from a policy-driven to a rights- and law-based
operation.
Keywords:
Carbon
emission rights; Usufructuary rights; Ecological capacity resources; Quota
control rights; Ecological benefit rights
Cite This Article
SCIEPublish Style
Wang X, Jiang Y. Carbon Emission Rights as a New Form of Usufructuary
Right. Ecological Civilization2025, 2, 10015. https://doi.org/10.70322/ecolciviliz.2025.10015
AMA Style
Wang X, Jiang Y. Carbon Emission Rights as a New Form of Usufructuary
Right. Ecological Civilization. 2025; 2(4):10015. https://doi.org/10.70322/ecolciviliz.2025.10015