1.
Losses and damages
due to climate change can be divided into two categories: Economic losses,
which include the loss of resources, goods and services that can be generally
traded in the marketplace, loss of income (including agricultural production
and tourism, and business) and physical losses (including infrastructure and
property); and non-economic losses, which are goods that cannot be generally
traded in the marketplace, including non-economic losses to individuals (life,
health and human migration); societal non-economic losses (cultural heritage,
territory, indigenous knowledge, social and cultural identity); and
environmental losses (biodiversity and ecosystem services). It can therefore be
argued that climate change-induced human migration has been identified as a
non-economic loss.See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), “Non-economic losses in the context of the work program on loss and
human migration”. context of the work programme on loss and damage”,
FCCC/TP/2013/2, Oct. 9, 2013, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/tp/02.pdf.
2.
Docherty B, Giannini T. Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees.
Harv. Environ. Law Rev. 2009,
33, 327. [
Google Scholar]
3.
The study of climate
refugees from the perspective of international law began at the end of the
twentieth century, and has since undergone rapid development, with a large
number of new research results.
4.
For instance, based
on metrics such as “carbon dioxide emissions per capita,” “ecological
footprint,” “gross national income,” and “human development index,” Bayes Ahmed
estimated that Australia and the United States should each assume a 10% share
of the global climate refugee burden. Following this, Canada and Saudi Arabia
would each contribute 9%, with South Korea at 7%, and Russia, Germany, and
Japan at 6%. Tracey Skillinton advocates for a comprehensive consideration of
factors such as population density and resource availability, emphasizing the
simultaneous establishment of incentive systems for transnational cooperation,
such as tax and fund mechanisms for natural resource redistribution. Katrina
Miriam Wyman advocates for the use of natural resource capacity (land
development/population density) and income wealth level (GDP per capita) as
criteria for the allocation of responsibility. She analyzes the potential
300,000 future climate migrants from the Maldives as an example of how to
distribute the responsibility among 34 OECD countries, China, Brazil, India,
and Russia. Furthermore, Mathias Risee proposes the “Polluter Pays Principle +
Ability to Pay Principle,” which allocates the burden of climate migration
among countries based on historical per capita emissions contributing to the
consequences of climate change and the level of per capita income in country.
See Bayes Ahmed, “Who Takes Responsibility for the Climate Refugees?”, International
Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2018,
pp.
5–7; See Katrina Miriam Wyman, “Sinking Islands. “Property in Land and Other Resources”, edited by Daniel H. Cole
& Elinor Ostrom, Puritan Press, 2012, pp.460–464; Tracey Skillinton,
“Reconfiguring the Contours of Statehood and the Rights of Peoples of
Disappearing States in the Age of Global Climate Change”, Social Sciences, 2016, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 55–56; Mathias Risee,
“The Right to Relocation: Disappearing Islands Nations and Common Ownership of
the Earth”, Ethics and International Affairs,
2009, Vol.23, No.3, p.296.
5.
See Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report.
Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva, Switzerland, 2015,
pp.56–74. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; IPCC: Geneva,
Switzerland, 2015; pp.56–74.
6.
Wong PP. Small Island
Developing Islands.
Wiley Interdiscip. Rev. Clim. Change 2011,
2, 1–6. [
Google Scholar]
7.
See Tim Stephens,
“Storm Warnings: Twenty-First Century Challenges for the Law of the Sea”, Sydney
Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 16/21, Mar., 2016,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2747779.
8.
See Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report.
Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva, Switzerland, 2015, pp.
21, 60–62.
9.
Rosemary Rayfuse,
“W(h)ither Tuvalu? International Law and Disappearing States”, University of
New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series No. 9, 2009, p. 1. Law Research
Series No. 9, 2009, p. 1.
10.
As early as 1999, Kiribati had already lost
parts of its rocky reefs to permanent subsidence below the surface and lost two
uninhabited islands, Tebua Tarawa and Abanuea. (See
Orion Magazine—The Republic of
Kiribati Islands Faces an Uncertain Future)In 2004, the South Asian tsunami submerged about
two-thirds of the Maldives for a time.(See
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effect_of_the_2004_Indian_Ocean_earthquake_on_the_Maldives#:~:text=In%20the%20independent%20republic%20of%20Maldives%2C%20all%20islands,Indian%20Ocean%20earthquake%20on%2026%20December%202004.%20)
In 2006, India’s island of Lohachala became the first island in the world to be
permanently inundated by sea water with its own nationals (around 10,000) on an
island. (See
Independent Online Edition >
Environment (archive.org))
The Solomon Islands also had five islands completely submerged under the sea. (https://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/10/world/pacific-solomon-islands-disappear/index.html) Since 2007, nationals of the island of Kathrite in
Papua New Guinea have been evacuating as their land has been submerged.
11.
Statistically, the
frequency of Category 4+ hurricanes in the western Pacific Ocean due to climate
change has risen from 25% in 1975–1989 to 41% in 1990–2004. See P. J. Webster
(eds.), “Changes in Tropical Cyclone Number, Duration, and Intensity in a
Warming Environment”, Science, Vol. 309, No 5742, 2005, p. 184. Duration, and
Intensity in a Warming Environment”, Science, Vol. 309, No. 5742, 2005,
p. 1846.
12.
Balesh R. Submerging Islands: Tuvalu and Kiribati as Case Studies Illustrating the Need for a Climate Refugee Treaty.
Environ. Earth Law J. 2015,
5, 81–83. [
Google Scholar]
13.
Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and
Vulnerability: Working Group II Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge,
UK, 2014; pp.1619–1626.
14.
Bo M. Bo M. Rising
Sea Levels: Challenges and Responses for Small Island Developing States from
the Perspective of International Law—The Prospect of Cooperation between China
and Small Island States.
Int. Law Stud. 2018,
6, 48 (in Chinese). [
Google Scholar]
15.
See Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and
Vulnerability: Working Group II Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press,
2014, p.1353.
16.
See Norwegian Refugee
Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (NRC/IDMC), “2018 Global Report
on Internal Displacement “, May.16, 2018,
https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2018/downloads/2018-GRID.pdf.
17.
See Internal
Displacement Monitoring Center, “Technical Paper: The Risk of Disaster-Induced
Displacement - South Pacific Island States “, Jan. 1, 2014,
https://www.alnap.org/help-library/technical-paper-the-risk-of-disaster-induced-displacement-south-
pacific-island-states.
18.
See European
Environment Agency, Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change in Europe,
European Environment Agency, 2006, pp.22–23, https://
meteo.lcd.lu/globalwarming/EEA_reports/vulnerabilty_and_adaptation_technical_report_7_2005.pdf.
19.
See Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and
Vulnerability: Working Group II Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press,
2014, p.1060.
20.
See International
Organization for Migration (IMO), “World Migration Report 2020”, Nov. 2019,
https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf.
21.
See United Nations
University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), “Tuvalu:
Climate Change and Migration,” Nov. 2016, 2016.
https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:5856/Online_No_18_Tuvalu_Report_161207_.pdf;
“Nauru: Climate Change and Migration”, Nov., 2016,
https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:5902/Online_No_19_Nauru_Report_161207.pdf;
“Kiribati: Climate Change and Migration”, Nov., 2016,
https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:5903/Online_No_20_Kiribati_Report_161207.pdf.
22.
For example, some
scholars predict that the number of people displaced globally due to climate
change will be between 200 million and 1 billion by 2050. See Frank Laczko,
Christine Aghazarm, “Migration, Environment and Climate Change. Assessing the
Evidence”, 2009,
https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migration_and_environment.pdf.
23.
The 2018 Global
Compact on Refugees refers to “climate, environmental degradation and natural
disasters, while not the cause of refugee movements, are increasingly
interacting with refugee drivers.” See General Assembly, “Part II Global
Compact on Refugees of the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees”, A/73/12 (Part II)), Sept. 13, 2018,
https://www.unhcr.org/gcr/GCR_English.pdf.
24.
See Keely Boom, “The
Rising Tide of International Climate Litigation: An Illustrative hypothetical
of Tuvalu v. Australia”, in Randall S. Abate and Elizabeth Ann Kronk eds., Climate
Change and Indigenous Peoples: The Search for Legal Remedies, 2013,
pp.411–433.
25.
Sovacool BK. Hard and Soft Paths for Climate Change Adaptation.
Clim. Policy 2011,
11, 1180. [
Google Scholar]
26.
Connell J. Vulnerable Islands: Climate Change, Tectonic Change, and Changing Livelihoods in the Western Pacific.
Contemp. Pac. 2015,
27, 10. [
Google Scholar]
27.
Burkett M. The Nation Ex-Situ: On Climate Change, Deterritorialized Nationhood and the Post-climate Era.
Clim. Law 2011,
2, 352–353. [
Google Scholar]
28.
Balesh R. Submerging Islands: Tuvalu and Kiribati as Case Studies Illustrating the Need for a Climate Refugee Treaty.
Environ. Earth Law J. 2015,
5, 89. [
Google Scholar]
29.
Atapattu S. Climate Change, Human Rights and Forced Migration: Implications for International Law.
Wis. Int. Law J. 2009,
27, 633. [
Google Scholar]
30.
See Statement by the
Honorable Johnson Toribiong President of the Republic of Palau to the 66th
Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Statement by His
Excellency, Tommy Remengesau Jr. President of the Republic of Palau to the 68th
Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Statement by His
Excellency, Tommy Remengesau Jr. President of the Republic of Palau to the 69th
Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly.
31.
Cao Y. The Alliance of Small Island States in Global Climate Negotiations.
Mod. Int. Relat. 2011,
8, 40–52 (in Chinese). [
Google Scholar]
32.
Zhang C. The Rearch on International Responses to the Small Island Countries’Loss and Damage Caused by Climate Change.
Pac. J. 2017,
9, 14 (in Chinese). [
Google Scholar]
33.
See Jane McAdam,
“Refusing ‘Refuge’ in the Pacific: (De)Constructing Climate-Induced
Displacement in International Law”, in Etienne Piguet, Antoine Pécoud and Paul
de Guchteneire eds., in Etienne Piguet, Antoine Pécoud and Paul de Guchteneire
eds., Migration and Climate Change,
Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 107.
34.
Kelman I, Stojanov R, Khan S, Gila OA, Duz B, Vikhrov D. Islander mobilities: Any change from climate change?
Int. J. Glob. Warm. 2015,
8, 584–602. [
Google Scholar]
35.
Siobhan M-L. Human
Rights and Climate Change: Reflections on International Legal Issues and
Potential Policy Relevance. In Nations
Legal Implications of Rising Seas and A Changing Climate, Michael BG, Gregory EW, eds.; Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2013; pp. 195, 228.
36.
According to the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Report published on Aug9,2021,
emissions of greenhouse gases from human activities are responsible for
approximately 1.1°C of warming since 1850–1900, and finds that averaged over
the next 20 years, global temperature is expected to reach or exceed 1.5°C of
warming. The report projects that in the coming decades climate changes will
increase in all regions. For 1.5°C of global warming, there will be increasing
heat waves, longer warm seasons and shorter cold seasons. At 2°C of global
warming, heat extremes would more often reach critical tolerance thresholds for
agriculture and health, the report shows. But it is not just about temperature.
Climate change is bringing multiple different changes in different regions –
which will all increase with further warming. These include changes to wetness
and dryness, to winds, snow and ice, coastal areas and oceans. (See
https://www.ipcc.ch/2021/08/09/ar6-wg1-20210809-pr/n).
37.
The impacts of
climate change affect millions of people in the enjoyment of a wide range of
human rights, including the rights to food, water and sanitation, health and
adequate housing. Migrants fleeing the effects of climate change do not do so
out of choice, but out of a need to escape from conditions that do not provide
even the most basic rights. Throughout their migration, they face xenophobia,
poor access to food, water, health care and housing, and the ever-present
threat of arbitrary detention, human trafficking, violent attacks, rape and
torture.See UN Human Rights Council (UNHCR), “Summary of the panel discussion
on human rights, climate change, migrants and persons displaced across
international borders”, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/35, Nov. 14, 2017, https://undocs.org/A/HRC/37/35.
38.
See Sheila
Watt-Cloutier, Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights
Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming. Caused by Acts
and Omissions of the United States, Dec. 7, 2005,
http://law.uh.edu/faculty/thester/courses/ICC_Petition_7Dec05.pdf.
39.
Rana B. Submerging Islands: Tuvalu and Kiribati as Case Studies Illustrating the Need for a Climate Refugee Treaty.
Environ. Earth Law J. 2015,
5, 100–101. [
Google Scholar]
40.
See UN Human Rights
Council (UNHRC), “Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights on the Relationship between Climate Change and Human Rights”,
U.N. Doc.
41.
Gong Y. Liability for Climate Change Damage in the Context of Human Rights Law: Illusion or Reality.
Legal Sci. 2013,
1, 75–85 (in Chinese). [
Google Scholar]
42.
International human
rights law extends the scope of States’ protection obligations from refugees to
persons at risk of arbitrary deprivation of life, torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. This is often referred to as “complementary
protection” because it provides protection that is additional to that provided
by the Refugee Convention. These protections are derived from the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and the Convention against Torture, and are also embodied in
the European Convention on Human Rights. (Article 5 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and article 7 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, both of which provide that no one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment).
43.
Jane M. The Emerging New Zealand Jurisprudence on Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement.
PKU Int. Compar. Law Rev. 2016,
1, 75 (in Chinese). [
Google Scholar]
44.
Kara KM. Extending Refugee Definitions to Cover Environmentally Displaced Persons Displaces Necessary Protection.
IOWA Law Rev. 2009,
94, 166. [
Google Scholar]
45.
See Jane McAdam,
Environmental Migration Governance, UNSW Law Research Paper No. 2009-1,
Feb. 28, 2009, https://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1143&context=unswwps-flrps09.
46.
Black’s Law
Dictionary even provides a conceptual definition of a “climate refugee” as “a
person who has been displaced as a result of a severe weather event or climate
change (e.g., flood, drought).” See Refugee, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.
2014).
47.
Angela W. Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees.
Int. Law Policy 2008,
30, 514. [
Google Scholar]
48.
Tony GP. Rising Seas, Receding Coastlines and Vanishing Maritime Estates and Territories: Possible Solutions and Reassessing the Role of International Law.
Int. Comm. Law Rev. 2014,
16, 27. [
Google Scholar]
49.
Kara KM. Extending Refugee Definitions to Cover Environmentally Displaced Persons Displaces Necessary Protection.
IOWA Law Rev. 2009,
94, 1115–1130. [
Google Scholar]
50.
As new international situations have evolved in recent years, the concept
of refugee has been appropriately expanded in the documents of a number of
international organizations or in regional treaties. The United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), for example, defines a refugee as “a person who has
left his or her country of origin because he or she is no longer able to live
in his or her homeland or because he or she fears some kind of harm, which may
include war or natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods.” The 1969
Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on Refugees and the 1984
Cartagena Declaration, which include displacement caused by events that jeopardize
public order, also imply, to some extent, that “environment” and “public order”
can be considered as distinct from other factors, such as social, economic,
social and cultural factors. These factors can be juxtaposed with other factors
such as social, political, war and economic factors.
51.
Specifically, on the one hand, countries of origin of refugees tend to
bargain in a moral and humanitarian manner to extend protection to asylum
seekers, while on the other hand, other countries are reluctant to take on more
responsibility.See Stellina Jolly
and Nafees Ahmad, “Climate Refugees under International Climate Law and
International Refugee Law: Towards Addressing the Protection Gaps and Exploring
the Legal Alternatives for Criminal Justice,” ISIL Year Book of
International Humanitarian and Refugee Law, Vol. 14, 2014–2015, p. 237.
52.
See Jane McAdam, Supra note 45.
53.
See Rebecca Dowd,
Jane McAdam, “International Cooperation and Responsibility Sharing to Combat
Climate Change: Lessons for International Refugee Law,” Melbourne Journal of
International Law, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2017, pp. 180–218.
54.
See Bonnie Docherty, Tyler
Giannini, “Confronting a rising tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate
Change Refugees”. Harvard Environmental Law Review,
Vol. 33, 2009, pp. 393–394.
55.
See Liang Shuying,
International Refugee Law, Intellectual Property Press, 2009 edition, p. 148
(in Chinese).
56.
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has adopted resolutions
authorizing the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to deal
with internally displaced persons, but has not yet explicitly authorized the
International Refugee Agency (UNHCR) or the Office of the High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) to respond to climate refugees.See General Assembly, Res. 47/105, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/47/105, Dec. 16, 1992, at § 14, http//www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r105.htm.Although
UNHCR’s Executive Committee has advocated for the adoption of the refugee
definition set out in the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention on
Refugees and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration, which could encompass persons
displaced by climate refugees, UNHCR has consistently refused to provide relief
to the entire population of climate refugees.See Elisa Fornale and Curtis F J Doebbler,
“UNHCR and protection and assistance for the victims of climate change”, The
Geographical Journal, 2017, pp.329–335.
57.
Benoit M. Environmental Migration: Prospects for A Regional Governanhce in the Asia Pacific Region.
Asia Pac. J. Environ. Law 2013,
16, 77–103. [
Google Scholar]
58.
Ilan K. Difficult Decisions: Migration from Small Island Developing States under Climate Change.
Earth’s Future 2015,
3, 133–142. [
Google Scholar]
59.
The Global Compact for Refugees provides for solutions to the climate
refugee problem in a number of articles. Examples include “disaster risk
reduction” (Article 9), preparedness measures (Articles 52, 53), the importance
of global, regional and national mechanisms for early warning and early action
(Article 53), and “evidence-based projections of future population movements”
and “integration of refugees into disaster risk reduction strategies” (Article
79).
60.
See UN Human Rights
Council, “Summary of the panel discussion on human rights, climate change,
migrants and persons displaced across international borders”, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/37/35, Nov. 14, 2017, https://undocs.org/A/HRC/37/35.
61.
See Ekardt, F.;
Bärenwaldt, M.The German Climate Verdict, Human Rights, Paris Target, and EU
Climate Law. p.4.
62.
Piguet E, Kaenzig R, Guelat J. The Uneven Geography of Research on ‘Environmental Migration’.
Popul. Environ. 2018,
39, 357–383. [
Google Scholar]
63.
Ruth G. Climate Change and the Poorest Nations: Further Reflections on Global Inequality.
Univ. Colo. Law Rev. 2007,
78, 1583. [
Google Scholar]
64.
In accordance with
Article 4, paragraph 1 (b), of the UNFCCC, all Parties shall take measures to
facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change. Paragraph 4 of the same
Article provides that developed country Parties and other developed Parties
included in Annex II shall also assist developing country Parties that are
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the
costs of adaptation to those adverse effects.
65.
Because migration and
resettlement are used as an adaptation strategy, climate displacement can be
analyzed through an adaptation framework. However, understanding climate
displacement through the lens of adaptation may oversimplify the complexity of
the issue.
66.
The Warsaw
International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change was
established at the 2013 Warsaw Climate Conference at the urging of small island
States to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in
developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of
climate change, especially the least developed countries. The mechanism has
three main functions: to increase knowledge and understanding of comprehensive
risk management approaches to address loss and damage associated with the
adverse effects of climate change, including the impact of slow onset events;
to enhance dialogue, coordination, coherence and synergies among relevant
stakeholders; and to enhance action and support, including financial,
technological and capacity-building action and support, to address loss and
damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change. (See
https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/loss-and-damage/warsaw-international-mechanism#:~:text=The%20COP%20established%20the%20Warsaw%20International%20Mechanism%20for,change%20at%20COP19%20%28November%202013%29%20in%20Warsaw%2C%20Poland).
67.
See
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/5yr_rolling_workplan.pdf p.11
Strategic workstream (d).
68.
In line with the
Recommendations on Comprehensive Approaches to Avoid, Reduce and Resolve
Displacement Associated with the Adverse Effects of Climate Change, the WIM
Executive Committee recommends that Parties be invited to consider developing
laws, policies and strategies in the context of human migration, taking into
account human rights obligations and other standards and obligations under
international law; strengthening research and data collection, risk analysis
and information sharing while ensuring the participation of affected and
at-risk communities; strengthening preparedness and early warning; and finding
durable solutions for IDPs. The Executive Committee also recommended the
continued development of good guiding principles and practices, and called for
enhanced cooperation to avoid duplication of efforts on climate displacement
and to promote coherence within the United Nations system in addressing
population movements in the context of climate change.See Task Force on
Displacement (TFD), “Report of the Task Force on Displacement”. of the Task
Force on Displacement,” Sept. 17, 2018,
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/2018_TFD_report_17_Sep.pdf.
69.
Parties hold
different attitudes on the relationship between the issues of adaptation and
loss and damage, with developing countries supporting the independence of loss
and damage from mitigation and adaptation, while developed countries advocate
the inclusion of loss and damage in the adaptation framework. See Ma Xin et
al., “The Progress on Loss and Damage Negotiation for Addressing Climate Change
Under the UNFCCC”, Progress in Climate Change Research, No. 5, 2013, pp.
357–361 (in Chinese).
70.
Stellina J, Nafees A. Climate Refugees under International Climate Law and International Refugee Law: Towards Addressing the Protection Gaps and Exploring the Legal Alternatives for Criminal Justice.
ISIL Year Book Int. Hum. Refug. Law 2014,
14, 227–235. [
Google Scholar]
71.
Examples include land
that has been or will be lost due to sea level rise, loss of arable land due to
protracted droughts, lives that have been or will be lost due to an increasing
number of severe extreme weather events, etc. See Roda Verheyen and Peter
Roderick, “Beyond adaptation: the legal duty to pay compensation for climate
change damage”, Nov., 2008,
https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/b6531cce-4468-304b-a661 -dc41a3b76fd0/.
72.
See Task Force on
Displacement (TFD), “Report of the Task Force on Displacement,” Sept. 17, 2018,
https://unfccc.int/sites /default/files/resource/2018_TFD_report_17_Sep.pdf.
73.
There is a loophole
in the international treaty system on climate change regarding compensation for
climate change damages. See Jiang Xiaoyi and Qin Tianbao, “A Brief Analysis of
the Issue of Compensation for Transboundary Damage Caused by Climate Change”,
Learning Forum, No. 11, 2012, p. 73 (in Chinese).
74.
Hari MO. Learning from Environmental Justice: A New Model for International Environmental Rights.
Stanf. Environ. Law J. 2005,
24, 75–78. [
Google Scholar]
75.
The preamble to the
Paris Agreement states, “Recognizing that climate change is a common concern of
humankind, Parties shall respect, promote and take into account their
respective obligations with respect to human rights, the right to health, the
rights of indigenous peoples, the rights of local communities, the rights of
migrants, the rights of the child, the rights of persons with disabilities, the
rights of persons in vulnerable situations, the right to development, and the
obligations of the parties to gender equality, the empowerment of women and
intergenerational equity in taking action to address climate change”.
76.
Cosmin C. Hybrid Legal Approaches Towards Climate Change: Concepts, Mechanisms and Implementation.
Ann. Surv. Int. Compar. Law 2016,
21, 29–41. [
Google Scholar]
77.
See UN Human Rights
Council (UNHCR), “Summary of the panel discussion on human rights, climate
change, migrants and persons displaced across international borders”, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/37/35, Nov. 14, 2017, https://undocs.org/A/HRC/37/35.
78.
Xiao Y, Yuan F. The Development of International Law and a Harmonious World in the New Century.
WU Int. Law Rev. 2010,
1, 18 (in Chinese). [
Google Scholar]
79.
Zeng L. The Trend of Humanization in Modern International Law.
Chin. Soc. Sci. 2007,
1, 89–103 (in Chinese). [
Google Scholar]
80.
The traditional view
is that respect for human rights is not a fundamental principle of
international law. However, some scholars believe that the consideration of
whether a principle is a fundamental principle cannot be based solely on
express legal documents such as the Charter of the United Nations and the
Declaration of Principles of International Law, and that more evidence of the
existence of such a principle should be found in international practice. See
Xiao Yongping and Yuan Faqiang, “The Development of International Law and a
Harmonious World in the New Century”, WU International Law Review, No. 1, 2010,
p. 14 (in Chinese).
81.
Article 2 of the
UNFCCC states that “greenhouse gas emissions should be contained within levels
sufficient to enable ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure
that food production is not threatened, and to enable economic development to proceed
in a sustainable manner within a time frame”.
82.
Article 3 of the
UNFCCC sets out five basic principles of climate law in turn, including: the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities; the principle of taking into account the special circumstances of
developing countries; the principle of risk prevention and cost-effectiveness;
the principle of sustainable development; and the principle of international
cooperation. In relation to the principle of sustainable development, Article
3.4 of the UNFCCC states that “Parties have the right to, and shall, promote
sustainable development. Policies and measures to protect the climate system
from anthropogenic changes should be appropriate to the specific circumstances
of each Party and should be integrated into national development plans, taking
into account that economic development is essential for the adoption of
measures to address climate change".
83.
These include
providing climate resilience in countries of origin through disaster risk
management measures to radically reduce climate migration; facilitating the
upgrading of host countries’ resources and capacities through international
cooperation mechanisms to ensure that they are not undermined in their efforts
to achieve sustainable development goals; and providing resources and expertise
to support them in removing obstacles to return and creating conditions
conducive to voluntary repatriation or exploring the conditions for the
naturalization of refugees, among others. (See GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES
United Nations • New York, 2018. pp. 88).
84.
See General Assembly,
“Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,”
A/RES/70/1, Sept. 25, 2015, at
https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E.
85.
See
https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda.
86.
He J. The Human Rights Dimension of the Paris Agreement.
Hum. Rights 2017,
6, 99 (in Chinese). [
Google Scholar]
87.
John HK. Linking Human Rights and Climate Change at the United Nations.
Harv. Environ. Law Rev. 2009,
33, 477–498. [
Google Scholar]
88.
Cao M. China’s Legal Position and Strategy for Participating in International Climate Governance: Taking Climate Justice as a Perspective.
China Law J. 2016,
1, 34–38 (in Chinese). [
Google Scholar]
89.
The Paris Agreement
has set up a system for allocating emission reduction obligations that combines
a certain degree of top-level control with freedom and flexibility, making the
bottom-up model of global climate governance visible. See Yu Hongyuan, “Capability
Constraints for the Development of Artificial Intelligence in Russia and
Evaluation for Russia’s Dilemma of Participation in Global Value Chain”,
Studies in International Relations, No. 1, 2020, pp. 110–124 (in Chinese).
90.
Cao M. Supra note 88, 34–38 (in
Chinese).
91.
Mao J. Multiple Practice Forms of International Cooperation for Human Rights.
PKU Int. Compar. Law Rev. 2014,
1, 3 (in Chinese). [
Google Scholar]
92.
See UN Human Rights
Council (UNHRC), Supra note 42.
93.
Jane M. Swimming Against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty is Not the Answer.
Int. J. Refugee Law 2011,
23, 8. [
Google Scholar]
94.
Matthew S. Natural disasters, climate change and non-refoulement: what scope for resisting expulsion under Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights?
Int. J. Refugee Law 2014,
26, 404–432. [
Google Scholar]
95.
Gong Y. Supra note 41, 75–85 (in
Chinese).
96.
The basic idea of
this view is that, in the process of the transformation of primitive societies
into modern political societies, not only did they give rise to a system of
private property rights (both private property rights in the sense of domestic
law and territorial sovereignty and permanent sovereignty over natural
resources in the sense of international law), but they also retained the same
kind of limitation on property rights as pre-institutional rights of nature,
i.e., the recognized right of private property in the national and global
context is not an absolute and unfettered right, but rather it has always been
limited in its scope and effect by the right of emergency shelter and the right
of emergency refuge. Thus, in the event of a climate refugee tragedy, the
preconditions implicit in humanity’s agreement on the property rule are
triggered, the various natural resources of the planet are restored to their
original state of communion (in order to sustain the basic survival of all
human beings), and the climate refugees can claim their original collective
ownership of the planet’s resources and use the resources appropriated by
others in order to achieve self-preservation.See Katrina Miriam Wyman, “Sinking
Islands,” in Daniel H. Cole and Elinor Ostrom eds. Property in Land and Other Resources, Puritan Press, 2012, pp.
449–450; Mathias Risee, “The Right to Relocation: Disappearing Islands Nations
and Common Ownership of the Earth”, Ethics
and International Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2009, pp. 283–294.
97.
Modern international
law has established the self-determination of peoples as a fundamental
principle of international law, the basic meaning of which is: “All peoples
under alien colonial domination, foreign occupation and subjugation have the
right to decide for themselves their own destiny, their own political status
and to conduct their internal and external affairs independently, and this
right shall be respected by the international community, and all States shall
have the duty not to hinder, interfere with or deprive them of this right in
any way. Any failure
to do so shall constitute an internationally wrongful act for which the State
concerned shall bear international responsibility. The peoples and
nationalities of these countries have the right to conduct their internal and
external affairs independently and autonomously, the right to choose their
preferred political and social systems and the right to develop their own
economic, social and cultural activities independently. With regard to these rights,
all other countries are obliged to respect them without interference.” See Yang
Zewei, “On National Self-Determination and State Sovereignty in International
Law”, Legal Science: Journal of Northwestern University of Politics and Law,
No. 3, 2002, p. 40 (in Chinese).
98.
While the Global
Compact on Refugees covers the issue of refugees due to climate change, the
fact that the Compact is currently only an international initiative and is not
mandatory and binding determines that states may only take the limited measures
contained in the Compact to safeguard the rights of climate refugees.
99.
See UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “In Harm’s Way: International Protection in
the Context of Nexus Dynamics Between Conflict or Violence and Disaster or
Climate Change”, Dec., 2018, https://www.refworld.org/docid/5c2f54fe4.html.
100.
He J. The Human Rights Law Dimension of Climate Change.
Hum. Rights 2015,
5, 84–101 (in Chinese). [
Google Scholar]
101.
The basic meaning of the principle of non-refoulement is that states are
prohibited from refusing to receive climate refugees or returning them to
territories where their lives are at serious risk, specifically not to be
returned to the territory or borders of a country where they are unable to stay
or reside due to environmental degradation caused by anthropogenic climate
change. See Sun H. Research on the Right to
Movement of Climate Refugees. PhD Thesis, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China, Jun. 1,
2013, pp. 74–78 (in Chinese).